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A HIGH-LEVEL AFTEREFFECT, AND TWO
WAYS TO EXPLAIN IT
Imagine an experiment in which you show
someone pictures of a computer-generated
face displaying random expressions, rang-
ing from happy, through neutral, to sad.
You tell the participant that she must clas-
sify each picture as being either “happy”
or “sad,” and you note the point on
the expression continuum at which she
switches from mostly-“happy” classifica-
tions to mostly-“sad.” Then, you ask her
to repeat the task, but between each pic-
ture you have her feel, with her hands but
out of sight, the contours of a smiling face
mask. You find that her category bound-
ary has shifted: she now classifies more of
the pictures as “sad.” This result (reported
by Matsumiya, 2013) is an example of
an aftereffect, in which adaptation to one
input (the mask) has altered responses
to subsequent inputs (the images). It is
“high-level” in the sense that the adapting
and test stimuli have little overlap in their
initial sensory encoding (they are pre-
sented in separate modalities). There are at
least two ways to interpret this finding.
A DECISIONAL BIAS?
The presence of the smilingmaskmay have
altered the participant’s strategies or crite-
ria for labeling the expression images. For
instance, she may now be consciously or
unconsciously using the rule: “if in doubt,
say the expression was different from that
of the mask.” This interpretation places the
effect within the extensive catalog of con-
trast effects in the cognitive and social psy-
chological literature. For example, people
judge moderately qualified job applicants
as being less qualified after reading the
résumé of a highly qualified competitor
(Hakel et al., 1970; Wexley et al., 1972).
A PERCEPTUAL BIAS?
Alternatively, feeling the smiling mask
may have changed how the test pictures
look to the participant. Although she uses
the same strategies and criteria to arrive
at her decision, the boundary between
“happy” and “sad” expressions falls at
a different point because her encoding
of the stimuli has changed. According
to this interpretation, Matsumiya’s (2013)
effect is an example of a visual aftereffect,
akin to the temporary illusions induced
by prolonged exposure to a particular
color (Webster, 1996), motion direction
(Addams, 1834; Anstis et al., 1998), ori-
entation (Gibson and Radner, 1937), or
spatial frequency (Blakemore and Sutton,
1969). Such aftereffects can be visually
striking, and have been linked to changes
in the responsiveness of neurons selective
for the properties of the inducing stimulus
(neural adaptation—see, e.g., Kohn, 2007;
Webster, 2012).
Matsumiya’s (2013) effect joins a grow-
ing body of aftereffects between increas-
ingly abstractly-related adapting and test
stimuli. For example, people are more
likely to report an androgynous face as
being male after viewing a female face
(or vice versa; Webster et al., 2004),
or even after viewing female bodies
(Ghuman et al., 2010) or stereotypi-
cally female objects (Javadi and Wee,
2012). Analogous effects occur between
facial images depicting different identities
(Leopold et al., 2001), races, expressions
(Webster et al., 2004), ages (Schweinberger
et al., 2010), and geometric distortions
(Webster and Maclin, 1999). Further
examples of high-level aftereffects abound
outside of face perception: after receiv-
ing downwards-moving tactile stimulation
to their hands, people more often judge
an oscillating visual grating to be drift-
ing upwards (Konkle et al., 2009); after
looking at a looming visual pattern, peo-
ple more often judge a steady auditory
tone to be receding in depth (Kitagawa
and Ichihara, 2002); and after seeing a
series of urban landscapes, people more
often judge semi-rural landscapes to be
“natural” (Greene and Oliva, 2010).
In each of these reports, the afteref-
fect is interpreted as a perceptual bias due
to neural adaptation. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, high-level aftereffects may
provide exciting tools to investigate how
complex stimulus properties are encoded,
just as “low-level” aftereffects have for
simpler stimulus properties (Barlow and
Hill, 1963; Blakemore and Campbell, 1969;
Mollon, 1974; Thompson and Burr, 2009;
Thompson and Burr, although see also
Hegde, 2009 for a note of caution).
Already, face aftereffects have been widely
used to study the encoding of faces (e.g.,
Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes and Jeffery,
2006; Susilo et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011;
Storrs and Arnold, 2012; McKone et al.,
2014). If high-level aftereffects are deci-
sional biases, on the other hand, they may
all have a similar origin within amodal
cognitive processes and tell us little about
the representation of any particular stim-
ulus property. So how can one distinguish
perceptual from decisional biases?
METHODS TO DISTINGUISH
PERCEPTUAL FROM DECISIONAL
BIASES
THE BIAS MANIFESTS IN A “CRITERION
FREE” TASK
With the exception of Webster and Maclin
(1999), each of the high-level aftereffects
above was demonstrated using a “method
of single stimuli” (MSS). In an MSS task, a
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single test stimulus is shown on each trial
and the observer classifies it as belonging
to one of two categories. The placement
of the category boundary is determined
both by the participant’s sensory evidence
and by her criteria for applying each of the
response labels to that evidence (see Green
and Swets, 1966; Farell and Pelli, 1999;
Kingdom and Prins, 2010). Changes in
criteria can therefore produce exactly the
same pattern of response shifts as changes
in perception, making MSS data ambigu-
ous (Green and Swets, 1966; Gescheider
et al., 1970; Morgan et al., 2011, 2013;
Yarrow et al., 2011). Why then have many
papers in recent years claimed to report
novel perceptual aftereffects on the basis
only of MSS data?
Unfortunately, the best psychophysical
methods to measure perceptual experi-
ence are unsuited to high-level afteref-
fects. Visual appearance can be measured
without relying on semantic labels or
remembered reference stimuli only if there
exists an unadapted (or differently adapted)
location in the visual field. Adaptation
to simple properties, such as orienta-
tion, contrast, and spatial frequency, pro-
duces aftereffects localized to within a
few degrees of the adaptor (Gibson, 1937;
Williams et al., 1982; Ejima and Takahashi,
1985). A test stimulus can then be shown
within the affected region while a reference
stimulus is shown in an unaffected region.
The point of subjective equality (PSE)
between adapted and unadapted locations
is quantified by having the observer adjust
the test to match the reference, indicate
whether or not the two appear the same,
or decide which location contains the
“stronger” signal along some dimension
(see Kingdom and Prins, 2010). This last
task is known as a two-alternative forced-
choice (2AFC, or more generally, nAFC).
Isolating perceptual bias is still not
straightforward. If one shows the same
tilted grating in an adapted and unadapted
location and asks “which is tilted further
clockwise?” (a simple 2AFC), a strategy of
picking the stimulus in the adapted loca-
tion when unsure could produce a shift in
PSE between baseline and adaptation tri-
als (Schneider and Komlos, 2008; Morgan,
2013, 2014; Jogan and Stocker, 2014). Such
problems can be alleviated by elabora-
tions to the nAFC task, such as varying
the reference stimulus from trial-to-trial
so that a perceptual bias predicts opposite
PSE shifts for different reference stimuli
(Morgan, 2013, 2014; Morgan et al., 2013)
and presenting two reference stimuli in
unadapted locations, from which the par-
ticipant selects the one most similar to a
test shown in the adapted location (Jogan
and Stocker, 2014).
While there is no objective way to
measure a subjective perceptual bias,
nAFC methods with multiple reference
stimuli come closest to providing a
measure uncontaminated by decisional
criteria. Unfortunately they are only prac-
tical when the aftereffect is localized
to the adapted location. The position-
dependence of most high-level aftereffects
is unknown, but it seems likely that some
(e.g., cross-modal aftereffects) are spatially
global.
THE BIAS IS MEDIATED BY PROPERTIES OF
EARLY SENSORY NEURONS
Themagnitude of a perceptual bias is often
mediated by the receptive field properties
of early visual neurons. Adaptation at one
retinal location may not affect tests else-
where (see above), or adaptation in one
eye may not affect tests seen with the other
(e.g., McCollough, 1965). The bias may
even occur when the adapting stimulus is
suppressed from awareness (e.g., Blake and
Fox, 1974). These indicators are of limited
use in the present case, though, as high-
level adaptation may not be mediated by
properties of early visual neurons.
THE BIAS IS ACCOMPANIED BY
OBJECTIVELY-MEASURED SENSITIVITY
CHANGES
“Low-level” visual aftereffects are often
accompanied by reduced sensitivity to
detect the adapted properties. For exam-
ple, the image contrast required to detect a
grating pattern is selectively raised for pat-
terns with a similar orientation and spa-
tial frequency to the adaptor (Blakemore
and Campbell, 1969; see also Levinson
and Sekuler, 1980; Krauskopf et al., 1982).
Changes may also be found in discrimina-
tion sensitivity (e.g., Regan and Beverley,
1985; Clifford et al., 2001).
Selective changes in sensitivity near an
adapted value constitute reasonable evi-
dence for changes in sensory encoding—
they often accompany low-level afteref-
fects, are predicted by models based on
neural adaptation (e.g., Blakemore and
Campbell, 1969; Clifford et al., 2001;
Kohn, 2007), and not easily explained in
terms of decisional bias. nAFC tasks can
provide objective measures of sensitivity
(Green and Swets, 1966; Farell and Pelli,
1999) even when there is no unadapted
visual field location. In the domain of
face aftereffects, there is some evidence for
improved discrimination near an adapted
face (Rhodes et al., 2010; Oruc and Barton,
2011), although other researchers have
found no changes in sensitivity (Rhodes
et al., 2007; Ng et al., 2008).
THE BIAS FAILS TO MANIFEST IN AN “EL
GRECO TASK”
Since the opthalmologist Beritens pro-
posed that an astigmatism was to blame
for the oddly elongated figures painted by
the artist El Greco, many have pointed
out the fallacy in his theory: any opti-
cal distortion El Greco experienced must
have applied equally to both his subjects
and his own paintings (Rock, 1966; Anstis,
2002; Firestone, 2013). Likewise, if an
adaptation-induced bias is a literal change
in how things look, it should apply equally
to the test and to any reference against
which the observer judges it (Firestone
and Scholl, 2013). After adaptation, an
observer could be shown a test stimulus,
then asked to adjust or select a reference
stimulus to match it. Any bias shown in
this “El Greco task” is likely of a cognitive
rather than perceptual origin.
QUESTIONABLE METHODS TO
DISTINGUISH PERCEPTUAL FROM
DECISIONAL BIASES
THE BIAS HAS SIMILAR TEMPORAL
DYNAMICS TO A PERCEPTUAL ONE
Several authors (Leopold et al., 2005;
Ghuman et al., 2010; Matsumiya, 2013)
show that the magnitudes of their respec-
tive aftereffects increase logarithmically
with the duration of the adapting stimulus.
This is similar to the temporal dynam-
ics of tilt (Magnussen and Johnsen, 1986)
and motion (Hershenson, 1989) afteref-
fects, and is presented as evidence that the
high-level aftereffects in question share a
common mechanism with low-level after-
effects. A priori, the fact that two pairs of
variables are related to one another by sim-
ilar functions is poor evidence that they
are subserved by similar mechanisms (a
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sum of money accumulating compound
interest also increases logarithmically with
time). Temporal dynamics may turn out
to have diagnostic value, but only if effects
deemed perceptual on other grounds have
reliably different temporal dynamics from
those deemed decisional. These data do
not yet exist.
THE BIAS MANIFESTS IN SOME CONDITIONS
BUT NOT OTHERS
Kitagawa and Ichihara (2002) find that
although viewing a looming visual pattern
causes participants to judge a steady audi-
tory tone as receding in depth, hearing a
tone increasing in volume has no effect on
visual judgements. The authors argue that
this selectivity for particular adaptor-test
pairings indicates a perceptual origin (Van
der Burg et al. (2013) present a similar
argument). This relies on the assumption
that all adaptor-test pairings should be
equally effective in inducing shifts in deci-
sional criteria—it is not obvious why this
should be the case.
CONCLUSION
Much of the interest in high-level afteref-
fects depends on claims that, like colored
afterimages or motion aftereffects, they
involve literal changes in how the world
looks, feels or sounds. Such changes in
sensory encoding may help us understand
how the brain represents complex stimu-
lus properties and integrates information
across modalities. However, most high-
level aftereffects have so far been demon-
strated only as biases in how people classify
stimuli during method-of-single-stimulus
tasks, and are therefore equally consistent
with changes in amodal decision-making
processes.
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